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Abstract 
Social comparisons are important in the employment sphere. A “culture of 
unemployment” may evolve and prevail because it is optimal for an individual to remain 
unemployed when other unemployed individuals constitute his main reference group. We 
advance the idea that by making the receipt of unemployment benefits conditional on 
engagement in an incentive-enhancing activity (for example, work under state-sponsored 
employment schemes or participation in work-site-based training programs), a 
government can engineer a revision of the reference groups of an unemployed individual 
in order to induce him to seek work.  
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1. Introduction 
Unemployment benefits are believed to contribute to the incidence and sustainability of 
unemployment by dampening the incentive to search for employment (Katz and Meyer, 
1990; Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). In this paper we 
highlight the importance of social externalities related to unemployment in the design of 
disbursement of unemployment benefits aimed at inducing people to seek jobs.  
A large body of evidence from econometric studies, experimental economics, 
social psychology, and neuroscience (for example, Luttmer, 2005; Clark and Senik, 
2010) indicates that humans routinely compare themselves with others who constitute 
their reference group. The evidence that the unemployed are highly spatially concentrated 
(Martin and Morrison, 2003; Wheeler, 2007) supports the notion that other unemployed 
people constitute their main reference group (Clark, 2003); physical nearness is a natural 
determinant of social proximity. Then, “a culture of unemployment” is likely to gain a 
foothold and lead to long-term unemployment. Statistics speak for themselves: according 
to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, in September 2014 the long-term unemployed 
(jobless for 27 weeks or more) accounted for 36.7 percent of the unemployed.1 
The disincentive effect of unemployment benefits arises from income that is a 
substitute for wages lowering the marginal gain from employment and consequently 
dampening the incentive to search for work. Here, this line of reasoning is taken further. 
Rather than focusing on the level and duration of benefits, we look at the procedure for 
disbursing them. We study the effectiveness of a particular policy tool (conditional 
benefits) in lowering unemployment by influencing social comparisons and endogenous 
group formation. Evidence regarding the scarring effect of unemployment (for example, 
Arulampalam, 2001; Gregory and Jukes, 2001) indicates that the wages of workers who 
land a job after a long spell of unemployment (the “newly employed”) are significantly 
lower than the wages of workers who have been continuously employed (the “old” 
employees). Thus, the unemployed who successfully venture to enter the job market and 
who become newly employed feel the brunt of intensified comparisons with the “old” 
employees who earn more than they do. When unemployment benefits are disbursed 
                                                 
1 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t12.htm 
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unconditionally, participation in the job market is thereby penalized, whereas remaining 
unemployed partially shields individuals from unfavorable income comparisons. This 
“protection” weakens the incentive of the unemployed to seek work. 
However, when receipt of the benefits is made conditional on engagement in an 
incentive-enhancing activity such as work under state-sponsored work schemes or 
participation in a work-site-based training program, every individual on benefits, 
regardless of his job search activity, feels the brunt of intensified unfavorable income 
comparisons as he compares himself more with the employed people. The policy of 
conditional benefits transforms a disincentive into an incentive: if open market 
employment pays better than work under state-sponsored work schemes, the unemployed 
who are made to perform such work and thereby to compare themselves more with the 
employed will become more inclined to seek work. Thus, we outline a revised benefits 
scheme which makes unemployed people more likely to compare themselves with the 
employed. In short, under conditional benefits the relative deprivation cost of finding 
work which arises from comparisons that the newly employed make with the “old” 
employees is already sunk and, thus, the marginal reward from landing a job is higher 
than when the unemployment benefits are disbursed unconditionally.2 
 
2. Model and results 
We distinguish between two reference groups of an unemployed individual: “old” 
employees (OE), each of whom earns wage oew , and fellow unemployed (FU). In turn, 
the group FU consists of unemployed individuals who happened to find a job, becoming 
“newly employed” (NE), and earning a wage new , and of unemployed individuals who 
did not find a job, remain unemployed (U), and receive unemployment benefit uw . We 
                                                 
2 Our analysis could also add a rationale to public works programs such as the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme - a welfare program in India that guarantees 100 days of paid work a 
year for any unskilled rural laborer who wants it. 
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assume that u ne oew w w   and that wages follow a “narrowing wage gap,” namely that 
one eeu nw w w w   .3 
 When the individual’s earnings fall behind the earnings of others in his reference 
groups, the individual feels relatively deprived. Here, for an individual earning iw  and 
with average earnings in one of his reference groups G being gw , the relative 
deprivation, henceforth RD, is max{ ,0} ( )g iG
g
i
iRD w w w w
    .4,5  
 “Endogenous reference group formation” is reflected in a change of the weights 
accorded to the reference groups. When an individual is unemployed, he attaches a lower 
weight to comparisons with the “old” employees, denoted by (0,1)u OE   , than the 
corresponding weight when he becomes “newly employed,” denoted by (0,1)ne OE   , 
that is, ne OE u OE   . In addition, we let (0,1)FU   denote the weight that the 
individual attaches to the RD arising from a comparison with fellow unemployed.  
Let 0ie   denote the effort to search for work exerted by an unemployed 
individual i ; ( )ip e  the probability of finding a job; and ( )ih e  the search cost. We 
assume that ( )p   is strictly concave; ( )h   is strictly convex; both are increasing and twice 
differentiable; (0) (0) 0p h  ; and lim ( ) 1
i
ie
p e   (and, thus, also lim ( ) 0i ie p e   ). 
When unemployment benefits are doled out unconditionally (Scenario 1 below) 
searching for work is discouraged because RD will be heightened if successful, whereas 
when the benefits are conditional (Scenario 2 below) exposure to RD arises even if the 
individual does not search for work. This shift in perspective decreases the RD penalty of 
getting a job and thereby encourages the search for gainful work. 
                                                 
3 The magnitude of the wage penalty inflicted by a period of unemployment was estimated to lie between 
5% and 20% (Arulampalam, 2001; Gregory and Jukes, 2001) for British workers, and between 5% and 
15% for American workers (Hamermesh, 1989). With a gross unemployment benefit of less than 40% of 
preceding gross earnings in the majority of OECD countries (cf. OECD Statistics on Benefits and Wages; 
http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesstatistics.htm) our “narrowing wage gap” assumption, namely, 
that the difference between the wage of an “old” employee and the wage of a newly employed individual is 
smaller than the difference between the wage of a newly employed individual and the unemployment 
benefit, is plausible.  
4 Stark (2013) provides a brief foray into relative deprivation.  
5 Resorting to more refined measures of RD does not change our qualitative results. 
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Scenario 1: Unconditional benefits  
The expected utility of an unemployed individual is 
 
 
  
( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ),
FU ne FU ne OE ne OE
u
FU u FU u OE u OE
ne
i i
i i
U e p e w RD RD
p e w RD RD h e
 
 
  
  
  
      (1) 
namely, the individual becomes employed with probability ( )ip e , in which case he 
derives utility from earning wage new , is exposed to RD from comparisons with fellow 
unemployed ( ne FURD  ), and is exposed to RD from comparison with “old” employees 
( ne OERD  ). With probability 1 ( )ip e  the individual remains unemployed, gets 
unemployed benefit uw , and is exposed to RD from comparisons with fellow 
unemployed and with “old” employees, namely to u FURD   and u OERD  , respectively.  
We consider a partial equilibrium setting, namely we assume that the group of 
unemployed individuals is not large enough to change the demand for labor and, thus, 
( )ip e  does not change with the number of fellow unemployed who find a job. When 
choosing his search effort, the individual has a belief that a fraction [0,1]p  of his 
fellow unemployed will find a job and earn new . Therefore, the average earnings within 
the group FU are (1 )ne upw p w  . Hence,  (1 ) 0ne u nene FURD pw p w w       and 
u FURD   (1 ) ( )ne u u ne upw p w w p w w      . Also, ne OE oe new wRD     and u OERD   
.uoew w   Thus, (1) simplifies to 
  
( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ).
( )
( ) ( )
ne oe ne
ne OE
u ne u
i i
oe u
FU u OEi i
U e p e w
p e w h e
w w
p w w w w

 


 
   
  
   
  
 From the properties of the p and h functions it follows that U  is concave:  
 ( ) ( ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0.
ne u oe ne o u
FU n
e
i i ie OE u OEU e p e p w w w w w w h e              

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 An unemployed individual will choose to exert search effort 0ie   only if 
0
lim ( ) 0
i
ie
U e
  , namely, only if 
 0 0(1 )( ) ( ) ( ) 0
oe ne oene u u
FU ne OE u OEp p w w w w w w h             , (2) 
where 
0
0 lim ( )
ie
ip p e
  and 
0
0 lim ( )
ie
ih h e
 . 
 Under (2), the optimal effort level of an individual, *ie , is given by  
 * *( ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0oene u uFU ne OE
ne oe
i iu OEp e p w w w w w w h e              . (3) 
Claim 1. Under unconditional benefits, the weight of the RD towards “old” employees to 
be experienced upon finding a job, ne OE  , acts as a disincentive to search for work. 
Proof: We first note that the higher the ne OE  , the less likely it is that (2) is satisfied. 
When (2) is satisfied, by applying the implicit function theorem to *ie  in (3) we get that 
* *
* *
( )( ) 0.
( ) ( ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( )
oe ne
i i
oe ne oe
i i
ne u u
ne OE FU ne OE u OE
de p e w w
d h e p e p w w w w w w     
             
 
□ 
We can view *ie  as the individual’s strategy under some expectations about the 
effort choices of fellow unemployed. Thus, we search for strategies constituting 
symmetric Nash equilibria. 
The optimal effort of the individual is a function of his belief as to how many 
other unemployed individuals will find work, namely * *( )i ie e p . Under rational 
expectations regarding others’ search effort, and with homogeneity of the group of the 
unemployed, each individual conjectures that his fellow unemployed will choose the 
same level of effort e , and expects that a fraction ( )p p e  of them will succeed in 
finding a job. 
A symmetric Nash equilibrium, e , is thus given by  
 ( ( ))ie p e e
   . (4) 
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We first note that for (0) 0p p  , (2) is equivalent to   
 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) 0
oe nene u u
ne OE u OE
oep w w w w w w h           . (5) 
Thus, if (5) is not satisfied, then 0e   constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium. The 
following claim formulates the sufficient condition for the existence of positive 
symmetric Nash equilibria.   
Claim 2. If an unemployed individual chooses a positive level of search effort under the 
belief that no other unemployed individual is searching for work ( 0p  ), that is, if (5) 
holds, then there exists at least one symmetric Nash equilibrium such that * 0e  . 
Proof: If (5) holds, then because (0) 0p   we get that 
 ( (0)) (0) 0i ie p e
   . (6) 
Applying the implicit function theorem to (3) we get 
 
* *
* *
( ) ( ) 0.
( ) ( ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( )
ne u
FU
ne u u
FU ne OE
i i
oe n
u
o
i i O
e
E
e
de p e w w
dp h e p e p w w w w w w

   
            
 (7) 
Thus, from the chain rule we get that 
 
* *( ( ))( )i ide de p ep e
de dp
 , 
and then,  
   
* *
* *
( ) ( ) ( )lim lim 0,
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ne u
FU
ne u ue e
FU ne OE u O
i i
oe ne e
i E
o
i
de p e p e w w
de h e p e p e w w w w w w

    
            (8) 
recalling that lim ( ) 1
e
p e   and lim ( ) 0e p e   . 
Therefore, for the continuous function 
 *( ( ( ))) iF e e p e e  ,  
upon combining (6), (7), and (8), we get that (0) 0F   and that lim ( ) 0
e
F e   and, thus, 
there exists at least one point * 0e   such that *( ) 0F e  , that is, ( ( ))ie p e e   . □ 
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Scenario 2: Conditional benefits 
Suppose that the government makes the receipt of unemployment benefits conditional on 
the unemployed individuals performing some work. If this policy effectively mingles the 
unemployed with the employed, then the comparison horizon of the unemployed is 
revised. In our model, this intensification translates into replacing the weight u OE   with 
a parameter , ]( u OE ne OE     (a perfect mixing of the unemployed with the “old” 
employees obtains when ne OE   ). Additionally, we assume that not complying with 
the government conditional-benefit program, and thereby not obtaining unemployment 
benefit, is not a viable “exit option.” 
 Using a tilde to indicate a value or a function under conditional benefits, the 
utility of an unemployed individual is now  
 
 
  
 
( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( )
( )
1
( )
( )) ( )( ) ( .
ne
i i
i i
ne oe ne
i
oe
i
FU ne FU ne OE ne OE
u
FU u FU u OE
ne OE
u ne u
FU i
u
w
U e p e w RD RD
p e w RD RD h e
p e w
p e w
w
p w w hw w e
 
 

 
  
 

  
    
 
      
  
 

 
 The following claim delineates the effect of the policy on the search effort exerted 
by an unemployed individual. 
Claim 3. If an individual exerted a positive search effort under unconditional benefits 
( * 0ie  ), then the introduction of conditional benefits makes him increase his optimal 
search effort * *i ie e , and this increase is higher the more effective is the government 
mixing policy, that is, the closer is   to ne OE  . 
Proof: Because * 0ie  , condition (2) must have held. An equivalent condition to (2) for 
the case of conditional benefits is 
 0 0(1 )( ) ( ) ( ) 0
ne u u
FU ne O
e n o
E
o e ep p w w w w w w h            . (9) 
8 
Because u OE   , (9) is satisfied when (2) is satisfied, then surely * 0ie  , and the level 
of *ie  is given by  
 * *( ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0ne u uFU ne O
oe ne oe
i iEp e p w w w w w w h e              . (10) 
Applying the implicit function theorem to (10), we get  
 
* *
* *
( )( )
( ) ( ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( )
0
oe
i i
oe n
u
ne u e oe
i i
u
FU ne OE
de p e w w
d h e p e p w w w w w w   
            

 
  . (11) 
Thus, treating optimal effort as a function of  , * )(ie  , we get that 
* * *( () )ui Oi iEe e e      for any u OE   . Obviously, also * *1 2) )( (i ie e    for any 
1 2  , 1 2 (, , ]u OE ne OE     . □ 
 The following claim ascertains the impact of the policy on the search effort that 
constitutes the symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
Claim 4.   
a) Given the assumption that there exists a positive symmetric Nash equilibrium under 
unconditional benefits * 0e  , there exists also a positive symmetric Nash equilibrium 
under conditional benefits, * 0e  . 
b) If the sensitivity of an individual to the changes in the perceived probability of the 
others finding a job, 
*
ide
dp

, is small in relation to the marginal gain in the probability from 
increasing search effort in the Nash equilibrium, *( )p e  , specifically, if 
*
*( ) 1ide p e
dp
   , 
then the institution of conditional benefits shifts the equilibrium upwards, namely, 
* *e e . 
Proof:  
a) The symmetric Nash equilibrium in the case of conditional benefits satisfies a 
condition equivalent to (4), that is, 
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 ( ( ))ie p e e
     . (12) 
The existence of a positive symmetric Nash equilibrium in the unconditional benefits 
regime entails its existence in the conditional benefits regime (cf. condition (5) and 
properties (7) and (8), which, if satisfied for u OE  , hold also for , ]( u OE ne OE     in 
place of u OE  ). 
b) Treating ie
  as function of the parameters p  and  , and treating *e  as function of  , 
we rewrite (12) as 
 ( ( ( )) , ) ( 0)ie p e e        . (13) 
Applying the implicit function theorem to condition (13), we obtain 
 
*
*
*
*
0
1 ( )
i
i
de
de d
ded p e
dp

  


 
, 
which holds under the assumptions of part b) of the claim and the observation that 
* *( , ) 0i ie p de
d

 
  
 
, where 
*
ide
d

 is as given in (11). Because * *( )u OEe e    , we get that 
* * )(e e    for any u OE   . □ 
The overall effect of the conditional policy is thus an increase in the search effort 
of a single unemployed individual, and a likely increase in the intensity of search of the 
group of the unemployed individuals.  
 
3. Concluding remarks  
In this paper we advance a theoretical hypothesis regarding the design of eligibility 
criteria for unemployment benefits aimed at manipulating unemployed individuals’ 
comparison groups and thereby their incentive to search for work on the open market. 
 One way to affect the comparison group of the unemployed is to dilute the cluster 
effect by moving some of the unemployed to areas populated by the employed. 
10 
Andersson et al. (2014) report that in the US, proposals have recently been made to 
relocate residents of high unemployment neighborhoods to job-abundant neighborhoods, 
for example with a housing voucher program. But it is likely that such a policy will be 
costly. An example of a more modest means of encouraging reference group substitution 
is as follows. Suppose that a specific task can be performed by teams of four or five 
workers. There are several teams already at work; some consist of four workers, others of 
five. There are four unemployed individuals who are to be brought into the sphere of the 
“old” employees. Each of these four should be attached to an existing four-worker team, 
rather than the four forming a new team by themselves. It is worth adding that already 
before Andersson et al. (2014), several authors (Patacchini and Zenou, 2005; Gobillon 
and Selod, 2007; Kneebone, 2014) argued that a mismatch in geographical space is a 
cause of prolonged unemployment; if the unemployed could only be cheaply transported 
to where the jobs are, unemployment would take a beating. Here we address a 
“mismatch” in social space rather than to a mismatch in geographical space.  
A concern could be raised that our reasoning fails to allow for the possibility that 
the unemployed who are in receipt of unemployment benefits are stressed because they 
feel they are a burden on their society and have no role to play in its affairs. Such unease 
could, in itself, constitute an incentive to get to work. But then, our proposed policy will 
have a perspective that works against the policy: being assigned to work could be 
interpreted by the unemployed as being given a role in society which, in turn, could 
weaken their incentive to seek work on the open market. However, on further reflection, 
this argument seems to break down for two reasons. First, had the “idle” unemployed 
been worried about receiving benefits for no work and about having no role to play in 
society, they could have volunteered to carry out socially valuable work. It is when and 
because they do not, that our proposed policy matters. Second, there is considerable 
evidence that unemployment creates adverse psychological effects that impede or depress 
rather than energize or boost the drive to seek work (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 
1998, and references cited therein). But then, the case for our proposed policy becomes 
even stronger: once given work to do, the unemployed regain self-esteem, feel that they 
do contribute to their society and, overall, are on a sounder platform to initiate a drive to 
obtain work on the open market. Nonetheless, studying the hearts and minds as well as 
11 
the frustrations and aspirations of the unemployed constitutes a fertile ground for follow-
up research. 
12 
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